With this last post in Series of Law of Sedition in India we conclude with note that after passage of long 79 years of Independence finally on May 11, 2022 the Supreme Court of India awakened and kept implementation of abeyance of section 124A of IPC, which was originally enacted by way of a Special Act (XXVII of 1870) by British with sole aim to subvert the India’s independence movement.

New Delhi (AJRI): New Delhi (AJRI): The Law of Sedition in India After Independence  :The Law of Sedition has become one of most legally discussed subjects now days in India.

The Association of Judicial Reforms (India), working for  transparency and fairness in Indian Justice delivery system understands cruciality of this issue for India  and its citizens in era of openness, thus referring an article in the interest of transparency and fairness in Indian Justice delivery system.

As Article is long therefore we are publishing this in parts with sole aim to make readers understand the complexity on this issue in capsules.

Today we will discuss Offence of Sedition in India after independence

Sedition was not acceptable to the framers of the Constitution as a restriction on the freedom of speech and expression, but it remained as it is in the penal statute post-independence.

After independence, section 124A IPC came up for consideration for the first time in the case of Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras . The Supreme Court declared that unless the freedom of speech and expression threaten the 'security of or tend to overthrow the State', any law imposing restriction upon the same would not fall within the purview of Article 19(2) of the Constitution.

The Punjab High Court in Tara Singh Gopi Chand v. The State, declared section 124A IPC unconstitutional as it contravenes the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution observing that ―a law of sedition thought necessary during a period of foreign rule has become inappropriate by the very nature of the change which has come about.

By the first Constitutional Amendment two additional restrictions: namely, 'friendly relations with foreign State' and 'public order' were added to Article 19(2), for the reason that the court in Romesh Thapar, had held that freedom of speech and expression could be restricted on the grounds of threat to national security and for 'serious aggravated forms of public disorder that endanger national security' and not 'relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance'.

After this amendment, there were three different views expressed by three different high courts. First was that of the High Court of Patna wherein the court had held that section 124A of the IPC is not violative of Article 19(1)(a) as guaranteed by the Constitution on the ground that the expression 'in the interests of public disorder' has a wide connotation.

Second was the view given by High Court of Manipur wherein it was held that part which imposes a restriction on the right to freedom of speech and expression is void and ultra vires the constitution but the part which relates to exciting hatred or contempt against the Government established by law in India to be valid.

The third view was given by the Allahabad High Court in Case Kedar Nath Singh Vs State of Bihar wherein the section 124A of IPC had been held to be Ultra Vires the Constitution on the ground that it infringes the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression and is not saved by the provisions of article 19(2).

The constitutional validity of section 124A IPC came to be challenged in the case of Kedar Nath Singh. The Constitution Bench upheld the validity of section 124A and kept it at a different pedestal. The Court drew a line between the terms, 'the Government established by law' and 'the persons for the time being engaged in carrying on the administration'. At the same time, the Court struck a balance between the right to free speech and expression and the power of the legislature to restrict such right observing thus:

"The security of the State, which depends upon the maintenance of law and order is the very basic consideration upon which legislation, with view to punishing offences against the State, is undertaken. Such a legislation has, on the one hand, fully to protect and guarantee the freedom of speech and expression, which is the sine quo non of a democratic form of Government that our Constitution has established.  But the freedom has to be guarded against becoming a licence for vilification and condemnation of the Government established by law, in words, which incite violence or have the tendency to create public disorder. A citizen has a right to say or write whatever he likes about the Government, or its measures, by way of criticism or comment, so long as he does not incite people to violence against the Government established by law or with the intention of creating public disorder."

On May 11, 2022 the Supreme Court of India in case titled S.G. VOMBATKERE vs UNION OF INDIA ( WPC 682/2021) EDITORS GUILD OF INDIA AND ANR. vs UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. (WPC 552/2021) wherein the apex court kept in abeyance of section 124A of IPC till the Union Government reconsiders the provision. In an interim order, the Court says, “"We hope and expect Centre and State Governments will refrain from registering any FIR, continuing investigation, or taking coercive steps under Section 124 A IPC when it is under reconsideration. It will be appropriate not to use this provision of law till further re-examination is over"

With this last post in Series of Law of Sedition in India we conclude with note that after passage of long 79 years of Independence finally on May 11, 2022 the Supreme Court of India awakened and kept implementation of abeyance of section 124A of IPC, which was originally enacted by way of a Special Act (XXVII of 1870) by British with sole aim to subvert the India’s independence movement.