China Rise in 21st Century :An unclassified statement for the record of Annual Threat Assessment prepared by Blair confirmed that the rise of Asia in Geopolitical arena in contemporary era, as East and South Asia are poised to become the long-term power center of the world.
Know How United States Views India And China Rise in 21st Century
New
Delhi (ABC Live India): The Director of National Intelligence, Dennis C. Blair
submitted Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence on February 19, 2019.
An
unclassified statement for the record of Annual Threat Assessment prepared by Blair
confirmed that the rise of Asia in Geopolitical arena in contemporary era, as East
and South Asia are poised to become the long-term power center of the world.
China
and India are restoring the positions they held in the eighteenth century when
China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s
wealth. These two countries are likely to surpass the GDP of all other
economies except the United States and Japan by 2025, although the current
financial crisis may somewhat slow the momentum. Japan remains the second
largest global economy and a strong US ally in the region, but the global
economic slowdown is exacting a heavy toll on Japan’s economy. To realize its
aspirations to play increased regional and global roles will require strong
leadership and politically difficult decisions.
All
together—Japan, the “tiger” economies like South Korea and Taiwan as well as
the rising giants of China and India point to the “rise of Asia” as a defining
characteristic of the 21st century. China’s re-emergence as a major power with
global impact is especially affecting the regional balance of power.
As
in the Middle East, the United States has strong relationships in East Asia—a
network of alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Australia, and close partnerships with other countries—and a longstanding
forward military presence.
Countries
in the region look to the United States for leadership and for ways to
encourage China to become a constructive and responsible player in the regional
and global communities. Although China will have ample opportunity to play a
positive role, it also poses a potential challenge if it chooses to use its
growing power and influence in ways counter to US or broader international
interests.
China’s
Transformation
China
is thirty years into a fundamental transformation that will take many more
decades to complete. Although there have been moments when the government’s
effort to maintain control seemed on the verge of failure—notably the crisis on
Tiananmen Square in 1989—the government has been remarkably successful in
guiding reform. China has avoided the fate of most other socialist countries,
suffering neither the economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union nor
the stagnation of Cuba and North Korea.
We
judge China’s international behaviour is driven by a combination of domestic
priorities, primarily maintaining economic prosperity and domestic stability,
and a longstanding ambition to see China play the role of a great power in East
Asia and globally. Chinese leaders view preserving domestic stability as one of
their most important internal security challenges.
Their
greatest concerns are separatist unrest and the possibility that local protests
could merge into a coordinated national movement demanding fundamental
political reforms or an end to Party rule. Security forces move quickly and
sometimes forcefully to end demonstrations. The March 2008 protests in Tibet
highlighted the danger of separatist unrest and prompted Beijing to deploy
paramilitary and military assets to end the demonstrations.
These
same domestic priorities are central to Chinese foreign policy. China’s desire
to secure access to the markets, commodities, and energy supplies needed to
sustain domestic economic growth significantly influences its foreign
engagement. Chinese diplomacy seeks to maintain favourable relations with other
major powers, particularly the US, which Beijing perceives as vital to China’s
economic success and to achieving its other strategic objectives. But Beijing
is also seeking to build its global image and influence in order to advance its
broader interests and to resist what it perceives as external challenges to
those interests or to China’s security and territorial integrity.
Taiwan
as an area of tension in US-China relations has substantially relaxed since the
2008 election of Ma Ying-jeou. The new Taiwanese President inaugurated in May
has resumed dialogue with Beijing after a nine-year hiatus, and leaders on both
sides of the Taiwan Strait are now cautiously optimistic that a new period of
less confrontational relations has begun. Many outstanding challenges remain,
however, and the two sides eventually will need to confront issues such as
Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. Beijing has not
renounced the use of force against the island, and China’s leaders see
maintaining the goal of unification as vital to regime legitimacy.
PLA
Modernization
Preparations
for a possible Taiwan conflict continue to drive the modernization goals of the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese defense-industrial complex. It
will likely remain the primary factor as long as the Taiwan situation is
unresolved.
At
the same time, we judge that China over the past several years has begun a
substantially new phase in its military development by beginning to articulate
roles and missions for the PLA that go well beyond China’s immediate
territorial interests.
•For example,
China’s leaders may decide to contribute combat forces to peacekeeping
operations, in addition to expanding the current level of command and logistic
support.
•China’s
national security interests are broadening. This will likely lead China to
attempt to develop at least a limited naval power projection capability extending
beyond the South China Sea. This already has been reflected in Beijing’s
decision in December to participate in anti-piracy operations off the coast of
Somalia.
Missile
Capability. China
continues to develop and field conventional theatre-range ballistic and cruise
missile capabilities that can reach US forces and regional bases throughout the
Western Pacific and Asia, including Guam. China also is developing
conventionally armed short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with terminally
guided manoeuvrable warheads that could be used to attack US naval forces and
airbases. In addition, counter-command, control, and sensor systems, to include
communications satellite jammers, are among Beijing’s highest military
priorities.
Counter
space Systems. China
continues to pursue a long-term program to develop a capability to disrupt and
damage critical foreign space systems. Counter space systems, including anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapons, also rank among the country’s highest military priorities.
Nuclear
Capability. On the
nuclear side, we judge Beijing seeks to modernize China’s strategic forces in
order to address concerns about the survivability of those systems in the face
of foreign, particularly US, advances in strategic reconnaissance, precision
strike, and missile defenses. We assess China’s nuclear capabilities will
increase over the next ten years.
Indian
Pragmatism
Like
China, India’s expanding economy will lead New Delhi to pursue new trade
partners, gain access to vital energy markets, and generate the other resources
required to sustain rapid economic growth. To sustain rapid growth, Indian
governments also must maintain the political support for economic reforms
needed to drive the expanding economy.
On
the global stage, Indian leaders will continue to follow an independent course
characterized by economic and political pragmatism. New Delhi will not
automatically support or oppose positions favoured by the United States or any
other major power. Nonetheless, good relations with the United States will be
essential for India to realize its global ambitions. Indian leaders will seek
benefits from American influence, trade, and technology. Strong ties to
Washington also will give India more confidence in dealing with China and in
mitigating the dangers posed by its long-time adversary, Pakistan. However,
Indian leaders often will adopt positions contrary to those favored by
Washington. India will be concerned about China during the coming decade
because of Beijing’s political and economic power and its ability to project
military force regionally, but Indian leaders will strive to avoid
confrontation with China.
Indian-Pakistan
Relations. Within
South Asia, one of the world’s least integrated regions, India will strive to
manage tensions with Pakistan, transnational terrorism, and spillover from
instability in small neighbouring states. Determined efforts by Indian and
Pakistani leaders to improve relations through the so-called Composite Dialogue
over the last four years could unravel unless Islamabad takes sustained,
concrete, meaningful steps to allay Indian concerns about Islamabad’s support
to anti-Indian militant groups.
This
is the case particularly in light of the November 2008 terrorist attack in
Mumbai. The attack has convinced many Indians that Pakistani military leaders,
in an effort to undercut India’s emerging international stature, now favor a
strategy of allowing Pakistan-based groups to attack targets that symbolize New
Delhi’s growing prominence on the global stage or that could undermine India’s
prominence by provoking religious violence in the country.
In
the absence of a military response against Islamabad, the Indian public will
look for visible signs that Pakistan is actively working to punish those
involved and eliminate its domestic terrorist organizations. Pakistan-based
groups could carry out additional attacks against India and run the risk of provoking
an India-Pakistan conflict.
In addition, India, which has endured a series of major terrorist attacks without major military response since 2003, is under domestic pressure to make rapid and significant improvements in its counterterrorism capabilities.
India
also will look for ways to safeguard its interests in light of the concluding
civil war in Sri Lanka and political uncertainty in Bangladesh and Nepal, which
have experienced dramatic transformations in government during the past year.
New Delhi generally will be supportive of democratic forces in its smaller neighbours,
while also being sensitive to the opinions of the Tamil and Bengali communities
within India.