Kursk incursion is politically a welcome shot in the arm for Ukrainian soldiers and civilians, and for Ukraine’s allies, all sorely in need of some good news, it could also rebound. There’s a risk that Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk and occupation of Russian territory (however short or long-term this proves) plays unwittingly into the Kremlin’s hands – by reinforcing its propaganda narrative that its “special military operation” is defensive, responding to and intended to thwart NATO’s aggressive designs, using Kyiv as its catspaw.
Explained: The Risks Involved in Ukrainian Incursion into Kursk
New Delhi (ABC Live): In the first week of August 2024, Ukraine achieved what many thought was impossible by launching an invasion into Russian territory—something not seen since World War II.
Over the past ten days, Ukrainian forces have reportedly made rapid progress, now controlling, according to Ukraine’s top military commander, about 1000 square kilometres of Russian territory.
Know what are the risks involved Ukrainian incursion
The military situation remains essentially unchanged. In what has become a grinding war of attrition in eastern Ukraine, the Russians have been making progress, albeit slow and costly, gradually pushing back the outnumbered and outgunned Ukrainian defenders. Ukraine remains short of personnel and military kit, despite the flow of additional American and European military equipment, including refurbished F-16 fighter aircraft.
There’s no sign (or not yet, in any event) that the Kursk incursion is forcing Russia to divert significant forces or equipment away from the Donbas front to reinforce Kursk.
Meanwhile, the cross-border incursion into Kursk is absorbing troops and equipment that Ukraine needs to bolster its beleaguered defences in Donbas.
And while the Kursk incursion is politically a welcome shot in the arm for Ukrainian soldiers and civilians, and for Ukraine’s allies, all sorely in need of some good news, it could also rebound. There’s a risk that Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk and occupation of Russian territory (however short or long-term this proves) plays unwittingly into the Kremlin’s hands – by reinforcing its propaganda narrative that its “special military operation” is defensive, responding to and intended to thwart NATO’s aggressive designs, using Kyiv as its catspaw.
So this attack is a calculated gamble by Kyiv.
It could pay off, especially if it does prompt the redeployment of Russian forces from Donetsk to Kursk, and if it leads to growing pressure at home on the Kremlin to call time on its invasion. However, the apathy and fear of the cowed Russian populace warrant scepticism on this latter score.
Equally, it could backfire badly, with Ukrainian troops squandered and forced to withdraw ignominiously, while pressure on Ukraine elsewhere on the front line continues unrelieved. This would leave the Kremlin able to portray the incursion as vindicating its narrative of a besieged Russia.
This seems a pivotal moment in the war, with finely balanced risks either way.